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INTRODUCTION
The past two and a half decades have seen increasingly brutal
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Ethnic ten-
sions and limited natural resources have contributed to the growth
of rebel militia and unruly national armies—particularly in the East—
which compete for land, resources, and soldiers. Seemingly endless
clashes between these groups leave no person in the DRC un-
touched. Women bear some of the most horrific of the war’s conse-
quences through nonstop sexual violence and gender-motivated crimes
committed by all sides.
One individual who has played a role in almost every army in
the DRC conflict is Bosco Ntaganda, known as “The Terminator.”
From the Rwandan Patriotic Front, to the Congolese national army,
to his own created militia—M23—and others in between, Ntaganda
led tens of thousands of men to sow fear in the hearts of the women
of the DRC and to ruthlessly commit sexual crimes. Nine years after
the International Criminal Court first issued a warrant for his
arrest, Ntaganda surrendered.1 However, the consequences of the
crimes he committed and the attitudes and impunity he fostered in
his men may never be erased. It is essential that the ICC fully and
effectively prosecute Ntaganda for his sexually violent crimes in
order to not only obtain justice for his countless past victims but
also to prevent the making of future victims, whether by the hands
of those Ntaganda trained or those who similarly take advantage of
conflict to rise through military ranks as he did.
The first section of this Note addresses the historical background
of, and various justifications for, sexual violence during conflict
throughout the world, as well as the modern changing international
norms. The first section pays specific attention to the development
of conflict-related sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, as well as the complicated web of factors that create a cul-
ture of impunity for the offenders. The second section discusses
relevant international law and significant international criminal
cases that bear on the prospects or likely outcome of the Ntaganda
case. The third section specifically analyzes the potential of the Inter-
national Criminal Court case against Bosco Ntaganda to reinforce
the changing international prohibition against sexual violence in
conflict. This Note does not purport to set out the legal argument for
Ntaganda’s conviction, but sets out a normative social argument for
why the ICC should focus on prosecuting the sexual crime charges.
1. See ICC: Congolese Warlord to Go to Trial, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 9, 2014),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/09/icc-congolese-warlord-go-trial [http://perma.cc/FQD3
-KE7S].
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I. BACKGROUND: SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING CONFLICT
A. History and Justifications of Sexual Violence During Conflict2
From the earliest records of history, women have been victims
of war alongside men: “men are killed and women are often raped,
beaten and raped, or raped and killed.” 3 There is evidence of wide-
spread sexual violence against women during conflicts, from Ancient
Greece to the Crusades.4 Even the Bible appears to condone and
encourage sexual violence against women during conflict: “For I
[God] will gather all the nations against Jerusalem to battle, and
the city shall be taken and the houses plundered and the women
raped.” 5 In more recent periods of human history, sexual violence
has persisted, “[f]rom rapes of black slave women and Shoshone
Indian women before, during, and after the Civil War to the infa-
mous ‘Rape of Nanking . . . .’ ” 6 Just as old as war and sexual vio-
lence during war is the impunity for such acts and “failure to punish
the [offenders],” 7 and therefore the lack of justice for the victims.
Acts of sexual violence committed during the American Revolu-
tion shed light on the specific characteristics of sexual violence during
a conflict, as opposed to peacetime.8 Soldiers on both sides of the
Revolution had direct means to commit their crimes and committed
2. It is important to note that “sexual violence in conflict” and “wartime rape” are
not the same thing. “Sexual violence” broadly encompasses any sort of violent—or threat-
ening—sexual act including rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, genital mutilation,
forcing one individual to rape another, and sexual humiliation. Elizabeth D. Heineman,
Introduction: The History of Sexual Violence in Conflict Zones, in SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN
CONFLICT ZONES: FROM THE ANCIENT WORLD TO THE ERA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 2
(Elizabeth D. Heineman ed., 2011). Similarly, “conflict” is a broader term than “war” be-
cause it includes conflicts in which war has not been officially declared, as well as acts
committed in the area of the conflict—by soldiers or civilians—rather than limiting the
scope to military acts of sexual violence. See id. Therefore, “sexual violence during con-
flict” is a much more appropriate term for the purpose of this Note.
3. Eileen Meier, Prosecuting Sexual Violence Crimes During War and Conflict: New
Possibilities for Progress, 10 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 83, 84 (2004).
4. Patricia A. Broussard, Repair Versus Rejuvenation: The Condition of Vaginas as a
Proxy for the Societal Status of Women, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 935, 944 (2011); see also
Kelly D. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes Under Inter-
national Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 288,
297 (2003) (“History is replete with reports of women being raped, sexually enslaved,
impregnated, sexually mutilated, and subjected to myriad other forms of sexual violence
during periods of armed conflict, mass violence, occupation, resistance, and transition.”).
5. Zechariah 14:2 (English Standard Version); see also Broussard, supra note 4, at 944.
6. Broussard, supra note 4, at 945.
7. Id. at 943–44.
8. See Sharon Block, Rape in the American Revolution: Process, Reaction, and Public
Re-Creation, in SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT ZONES: FROM THE ANCIENT WORLD TO THE
ERA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 25, 25–38 (Elizabeth D. Heineman ed., 2011).
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them with relative impunity.9 They utilized their military authority
to command women to open their doors or follow them to another
location, forcing the women into situations in which they were
assaulted.10 Perhaps even more relevant to the modern day is that
the Revolutionary soldiers used their weapons to threaten women.11
This is particularly significant: a soldier does not need to use brute
force or other means to commit these acts but has a weapon already
in his hand to aid him.12 This not only makes sexually violent crimes
easier to commit during conflict, but often more brutal. Equally rele-
vant to today is that often these crimes were committed—or at least
began—in open view, and the soldiers justified their acts by classifying
the victims as supporters of the enemy.13
There have been many justifications for sexual violence through-
out history. Though they are often interrelated, the notions of prop-
erty, power, “boys will be boys,” war booty, terror, and destruction
of the enemy developed and evolved in some sense over time. Histor-
ically,14 women were essentially the “property” of their father or
husband, making them legitimate property or spoils of war after a
defeat.15 The sexual violence committed against women was thus a
crime against the “owner”—the husband or father—and was a reward
to a victor in battle.16 During the Middle Ages, “unrestricted sexual
access to vanquished women” incentivized soldiers to fight well and
conquer towns and cities.17
Once customary law began to frown on sexual violence, such acts
were not directly encouraged but were ignored by commanders who
thought sexual violence made men better soldiers.18 Sexual violence
during the eighteenth to early twentieth centuries was characterized
as a lack of military discipline, revenge, or inevitable side effects of
war that “were rarely punished.”19 By the twenty-first century, sexual
9. See id. at 27. There were “more than [900] incidents of sexual coercion” from 1700
to 1820 in British America, including about 60 cases in which the alleged attacker was
a member of the military. Id. Only 24 of those military cases were prosecuted. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 27–28.
12. Id. at 28.
13. Id. (Two British officers accused of rape in 1776 said that their victim “ ‘was a
Yankee whore or a Yankee bitch, and it was no great matter.’ ”).
14. Here I specifically refer to early history, though the idea of women as the property
of men is still prevalent in some cultures to this day.
15. Askin, supra note 4, at 296.
16. Broussard, supra note 4, at 945.
17. Askin, supra note 4, at 296.
18. Id. (Many of the commanders “believed sexual violence before a battle increased
the soldiers’ aggression or power cravings and that rape after a battle was a well-deserved
reward, a chance to release tensions and relax.”).
19. Askin, supra note 4, at 296; Broussard, supra note 4, at 945.
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violence during conflict became not only an exertion of power and
control by one individual over another,20 but it was also used to
exert military power and demonstrate national pride for the purpose
of terrorizing, demoralizing, and humiliating the opposing side.21
B. Changing International Views on Sexual Violence in Conflict
It is clear that the international community today is no longer
the same one that used to quietly endorse the rape of women as
booty. Though there have been many justifications for sexual vio-
lence in armed conflict, sexual violence is no longer considered
justified in the modern age. As an international community, sexual
violence is not something to let slide in the name of sovereignty.
Though there may be some concerns about moral colonialism, this
is one area in which international norms should outweigh those
concerns.
[T]he laws of warfare have both implicitly and explicitly prohib-
ited the rape of combatants and noncombatants for centuries.
Increasingly, this prohibition extends to other forms of sexual
violence, including sexual slavery, forced impregnation, forced
maternity, forced abortion, forced sterilization, forced marriage,
forced nudity, sexual molestation, sexual mutilation, sexual humili-
ation, and sex trafficking.22
Customary humanitarian law, essentially the law of war, fun-
damentally prohibits conflicting groups from targeting civilians and
requires that warring parties “make continuous efforts to spare
[civilians] from harm to the maximum extent possible.” 23 Addition-
ally, domestic legal systems in the world almost universally prohibit
rape, making such a prohibition jus cogens.24 Crucial to the prosecu-
tion of humanitarian law violations is the imposition of individual
or superior criminal responsibility25 on the perpetrators and/or their
20. See Broussard, supra note 4, at 945.
21. Meier, supra note 3, at 87–88.
22. Askin, supra note 4, at 305.
23. Id. at 289; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention] (this con-
vention was intended to universally serve to protect civilians in times of armed conflict).
24. Jus cogens is customary international law, which is binding on all states, re-
gardless of their own domestic laws. See David S. Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in
International Humanitarian Law as a Norm of Jus Cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 219, 247 (2005) (detailing the jus cogens prohibiting rape).
25. Superior responsibility “is not limited to war crimes,” but extends to “crimes against
humanity and genocide.” Askin, supra note 4, at 326.
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superiors who encouraged the criminal acts or failed to appropri-
ately prevent them or punish them afterward.26
The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 explicitly forbade rape
during armed conflict,27 but qualified the crime as one of honor
rather than a serious human rights violation: “[w]omen shall be
especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particu-
lar against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent as-
sault.” 28 This undermines the integrity of a woman for her own sake
by phrasing the crime only based on her societal value and ignores
the individual, social, and cultural impacts of such a crime.29 This
essentially means that the worst crimes against women are those
upon their honor; those crimes are not discussed in terms of the
specific impact on the women themselves or their right to bodily
integrity or choice, but the discussion solely of honor clearly estab-
lishes that the worst crimes against a woman are really those affect-
ing her family and status.
The 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women defined gender crimes as “any act of gender-based violence
that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychologi-
cal harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coer-
cion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or
in private life.” 30 The UN General Assembly adopted the Conven-
tion’s Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in
1993.31 Article 2 of the Declaration recognizes the physical and psy-
chological components of violence against women.32 Perhaps more sig-
nificantly, it recognizes that the perpetrators of these crimes can be
not only within the family or community but can be the states them-
selves that actively perpetrate or passively condone such actions.33
The modern international criminal tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, as well as the International Criminal
Court, have been critical parties in the development of international
law prohibiting sexual violence during conflict.34 The DRC’s status
26. Id. at 289.
27. Geneva Convention, supra note 23, art. 27.
28. Id.
29. Stephanie K. Wood, A Woman Scorned for the “Least Condemned” War Crime:
Precedent and Problems with Prosecuting Rape as a Serious War Crime in the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 274, 282–83 (2004).
30. G.A. Res. 48/104, art. 1, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women
(Dec. 20, 1993).
31. Bronwyn Winter, International Versus Transnational? The Politics of Prefixes in
Feminist International Relations, in CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE: INTERNATIONAL
LAW, LOCAL RESPONSES 15, 28 (Tonia St. Germain & Susan Dewey eds., 2012).
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. See infra Part II.B.
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as a State Party member of the Rome Statute places it under the
jurisdiction of the ICC, which applies the Rome Statute and custom-
ary international law.35 Though there is a distinction between inter-
national armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts, the
ICC has jurisdiction over cases arising from both types of conflict.36
Some scholars have advocated for a dismantling or reduction of this
distinction in order to appropriately punish crimes committed in
civil wars.37 However, the international community has not em-
braced such a drastic change that would severely limit a nation’s
sovereignty.38 The ICC has specific jurisdiction over the Ntaganda
case because the DRC president referred the “situation.” 39
C. Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
1. The Modern History
The complex and tumultuous modern history of the DRC with
constantly shifting military and government groups has left count-
less victims. Soldiers and militia are not the only victims in these
conflicts; they are not even the most at-risk victims. Instead, women
and girls are being actively targeted in armed conflict.40 Major
General Patrick Cammaert, the former commander of the UN Peace-
keeping Mission in the DRC, perhaps said it best in 2008: “ ‘it has
probably become more dangerous to be a woman than a soldier in an
armed conflict.’ ” 41
In October 1996, the armed rebel group Alliance des forces démo-
cratiques du Congo (AFDL)42 moved from Eastern Congo43 through
35. See infra Part II.A.
36. See infra Part II.A.
37. Askin, supra note 4, at 290.
38. See Rogier Bartels, Timelines, Borderlines and Conflicts: The Historical Evolution
of the Legal Divide Between International and Non-International Armed Conflicts, 91
INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 35, 65 (2009).
39. See ICC: Congolese Warlord to Go to Trial, supra note 1.
40. Laura Sparling, Creating Second-Class Citizens at Home and Targets Abroad: A
Feminist Analysis of Protection in the Use of Force, in CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL
VIOLENCE: INTERNATIONAL LAW, LOCAL RESPONSES 33, 33 (Tonia St. Germain & Susan
Dewey eds., 2012). This Note focuses on sexual violence against women in conflict. How-
ever, the author does not intend to minimize the horrific attacks on men. That topic has
been thoroughly addressed in numerous scholarly articles. See, e.g., Valorie K. Vojdik,
Sexual Violence Against Men and Women in War: A Masculinities Approach, 14 NEV. L.J.
923, 923 (2013) (discussing cases of sexual violence against men).
41. Sparling, supra note 40, at 33 (address made at the 5916th meeting of the United
Nations Security Council regarding Resolution 1820 on Women and Peace and Security).
42. Gaelle Breton-Le Goff, Ending Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, 34 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 13,15 (2010).
43. Destabilization in the Eastern Congo allowed the AFDL to grow in power. See
JANIE L. LEATHERMAN, SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND ARMED CONFLICT 120 (2011). The AFDL
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the DRC with the support of Rwanda and Uganda, eventually claim-
ing power over the government in Kinshasa, DRC, in May 1997.44
Not only did the rebel army and its supporters commit acts of sexual
violence against women as it moved into the capital, but the retreat-
ing Mobutu government regime45 and DRC army personnel raped
and abducted women.46 The new regime did not improve upon the
actions of the old; instead, Laurent-Desire Kabila, the AFDL leader,
and his men oppressed, attacked, tortured, and committed sexual
violence against women.47 Perhaps due to the relative ease with
which he took power over the government, now-President Kabila
actively sought out and punished those who supported or even
associated with antigovernment individuals or “the enemy.” 48 When
Kabila asked the Rwandans and Ugandans to leave the DRC in
August 1998, they resisted and even more violence erupted, leading
to the second Congo war49 and Africa’s first “world war” due to the
multinational involvement.50 Amid this conflict, the Rassemblement
Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) quickly emerged.51
The RCD and other regional groups52 clashed in near-constant
violence in which all groups tried to weaken alleged civilian sup-
porters of other groups by engaging in vast and systematic sexually
violent attacks.53 Furthermore, when Rwandan and Ugandan forces
tried to quash the RCD in Kisangani, DRC, both groups specifically
attacked Congolese women, who were the unfortunate victims caught
in the middle of this rivalry.54 The RCD began to collapse, highlighting
was formed largely due to the exodus of Hutu militia fleeing neighboring Rwanda after
the genocide; they then joined up with anti-government Congolese militia and rearmed.
Jeanelle Ferril, A Call for New Justice: Victims of Sexual Violence in Africa’s Internal
Conflicts, 4 FIU L. REV. 333, 342 (2008).
44. Breton-Le Goff, supra note 42, at 15; LEATHERMAN, supra note 43, at 120.
45. The Mobutu government was plagued by rampant sexual violence. Breton-Le Goff,
supra note 42, at 14. Not only did it know of the sexual violence problems throughout the
country, but senior government officials who should have been examples of good behavior
and civic morality also committed sexually violent acts. Id.
46. Id. at 15.
47. Id.
48. See id. This was especially prevalent after the creation of the anti-governmental
militias or Mayi-Mayi in 1998. See id.
49. This war has continued since 1998, involving multiple countries thirsty for the
Congo’s (Eastern Congo and the DRC) resources, which has also inspired foreign nations’
involvement. LEATHERMAN, supra note 43, at 122. The DRC specifically is a significant
mining resource for tantalum and cassiterite, which are indispensable for making circuits
in high-end electronic goods. Diane A. Desiero, Leveraging International Economic Tools
to Confront Child Soldiering, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 338, 368 (2011).
50. LEATHERMAN, supra note 43, at 121.
51. Breton-Le Goff, supra note 42, at 15.
52. Such as the Interahamwe, Hutu militias, and Burundian rebels. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 16.
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the instability in the region and the ever-present threat to women55
as groups rising in power celebrated, and groups falling in power re-
taliated, against the civilian population with systematic and extreme,
often sexual, violence.56
In 2001, President Kabila was assassinated and succeeded by
his son Joseph.57 The Pretoria Accord peace agreements in 2002
dictated that neighboring troops leave the DRC58 and attempted “to
create a coalition government and to incorporate” militia members
into the DRC military, which had limited success.59 Not all rebels
and militia members joined the army, and of those who did, many,
including Bosco Ntaganda,60 later left and joined or created new
armed groups.61 The conflict in the region officially ended in July
2003, but the DRC remains unstable and violent.62
2. The Impact of Conflict
Since 1996, the near-constant conflict and continued insecurity
in the region of the DRC has provided many opportunities for the
government, military, and militia to commit acts of sexual violence
against women.63 The chaos and disorganization that plague the
area as rebel groups push forward and retreat create a constant
state of instability.64 The government cannot, or does not want to,
maintain control of the situation, and even has its own participants
in the atrocities.65 The fighting in the DRC is characteristic of post–
Cold War conflicts that localize violence into small areas, neighbor
against neighbor, when rebel groups are unable to expand their power
over large areas of land.66 However, the resource richness of the
DRC exacerbates the fighting because, unlike resource-poor states,
the militia and rebel groups have something of value to fight over.67
55. Id. at 15–16.
56. Id. at 16.
57. Broussard, supra note 4, at 947.
58. Id.
59. Breton-Le Goff, supra note 42, at 16.
60. See ICC: Congolese Warlord to Go to Trial, supra note 1; see also DR Congo: M23
Rebels Committing War Crimes, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.hrw
.org/news/2012/09/11/dr-congo-m23-rebels-committing-war-crimes [http://perma.cc/8PPX
-9KTG].
61. Breton-Le Goff, supra note 42, at 16.
62. Ferril, supra note 43, at 343.
63. Breton-Le Goff, supra note 42, at 16.
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. LEATHERMAN, supra note 43, at 24.
67. See id. at 110; see also Desiero, supra note 49, at 368 (noting the DRC’s highly
sought after mineral resources).
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Sexual violence in the DRC has been diverse in its brutality.
Soldiers and militia members commit gang rapes of women and girls
out in the fields, near their homes, and in front of their families;68
girls are raped and then forced to join armed groups;69 rapists use dif-
ferent objects to commit their assaults, from rifles, to bottles, to
pepper-covered pestles;70 parents are forced to rape their children;71
women are taken for sexual slaves, raped, tortured, beaten, humili-
ated, and sometimes killed.72 Women suffer from “permanent injuries,
fistulas, HIV infections, unwanted pregnancies, and the destruction
of reproductive organs.” 73 Each of the dozen armed groups in the
country has a “trademark manner of violating . . . .” 74 The rampant
sexual violence by mobile and constantly relocating armed groups
quickly and easily spreads HIV/AIDS among victims and perpetra-
tors alike.75
In times of armed conflict, soldiers often endeavor to prove their
masculinity to their fellow soldiers, with each action or inaction
proving significant.76 Anneka Van Woudenberg, senior Congo re-
searcher at the Human Rights Watch, said: “This is not rape be-
cause soldiers have got bored and have nothing to do. It is a way to
ensure that communities accept the power and authority of that
particular armed group. This is about showing terror. This is about
using it as a weapon of war.” 77 Soldiers wield rape to terrorize, and
women are too scared to fight back or even object because there is
no one there to listen or help. Women are often too ashamed after
being raped to report the rapes to the male soldiers around them,
and there are no female soldiers in whom to confide.78
Women and children escape from dangerous areas only to be
victimized in refugee camps by the very soldiers who are supposed
to protect them.79 The UN peacekeeping mission posted in the DRC
68. Breton-Le Goff, supra note 42, at 16.
69. Id. at 16–17.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 16.
74. Stephanie Nolen, “Not Women Anymore . . .”: The Congo’s Rape Survivors Face
Pain, Shame and AIDS, MS. MAG. (Spring 2005), http://www.msmagazine.com/spring
2005/congo.asp [http://perma.cc/52AS-3YUE].
75. Ferril, supra note 43, at 343.
76. See LEATHERMAN, supra note 43, at 17–18.
77. War Against Women: The Use of Rape as a Weapon in Congo’s Civil War, CBS
NEWS (Aug. 14, 2008), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/war-against-women [http://perma
.cc/BMK8-TNV3].
78. Tonia St. Germain & Susan Dewey, Introduction, in CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL
VIOLENCE: INTERNATIONAL LAW, LOCAL RESPONSES 1, 1 (Tonia St. Germain & Susan
Dewey eds., 2012).
79. Ferril, supra note 43, at 343.
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cannot even adequately protect women from sexual violence.80 Hor-
rifically, even UN peacekeepers have committed acts of sexual violence
and rape with almost total impunity.81 To avoid negative publicity
and to create the illusion of interacting with prostitutes rather than
raping these women, the forces gave out food and supplies to their
victims.82 Left with pregnancies and little justice, the legacy of the
UN’s involvement in the DRC is not that of peacekeeping, but of
violation and abuse.83
The impunity of the soldiers and militia serves only to further
encourage sexually violent crimes. The 2002 Military Code for the
DRC does not fully address the problem of sexual violence.84 Though
it allows for sexual offenses to be prosecuted as crimes against hu-
manity and through command responsibility, the Code left a gap by
not specifically utilizing the ICC definition of sexual violence, there-
fore leaving local military judges to define and develop this body of
law.85 Though the DRC criminal code can apply to both military
personnel and civilians, it is rarely used to combat sexual crimes
committed by official military and rebel leaders.86 Despite its lack
of efficacy at this time, the DRC purports to stand against sexual
violence during conflict, weakening possible arguments that inter-
national involvement is purely a moral colonial endeavor.
A very small number of soldiers who have committed sexually
violent acts have been prosecuted.87 Out of 7,703 new cases of sexual
violence the UN registered in 2008 in North and South Kivu prov-
inces—by all perpetrators, not just soldiers—only 27 soldiers were
convicted.88 According to the United Nations Joint Human Rights
Office in Congo, between July 2011 and December 2013, military
courts only delivered 187 convictions for sexual violence, with just
three senior officers convicted.89 In the DRC national army, the
80. Sparling, supra note 40, at 43.
81. Ferril, supra note 43, at 351; see also Michael Fleshman, Tough UN Line on
Peacekeeper Abuses: Action Initiated to End Sexual Misdeeds in Peacekeeping Missions,
AFR. RENEWAL (Apr. 2005) (discussing the UN steps planned to prevent future assaults
on populations by UN forces).
82. Ferril, supra note 43, at 351.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 355.
85. Breton-Le Goff, supra note 42, at 23.
86. Soldiers Who Rape, Commanders Who Condone, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 16,
2009), http://www.hrw.org/node/84366/section/1 [http://perma.cc/52HH-78QQ] [herein-
after Soldiers Who Rape].
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Democratic Republic of Congo: Ending Impunity for Sexual Violence, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (June 10, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/10/democratic-republic-congo
-ending-impunity-sexual-violence [http://perma.cc/M7KL-KBKN].
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Congolese Armed Forces or Forces Armées de la République Démo-
cratique du Congo (FARDC),90 commanders are essentially un-
touchable, as only lower-ranking soldiers are prosecuted and the
commanders in turn obstruct justice by protecting their soldiers.91
One aspect of the Congolese military justice system that exacerbates
this problem is that military judges must be higher ranked than the
accused on trial in order to try that individual, leaving the highest
ranked officers and commanders essentially untouchable.92
Furthermore, the policy in 2002 and 2003 that mixed rebels and
militia into the government army, and “the promotion of ex-rebel
leaders”—like Bosco Ntaganda93—to high-ranking FARDC positions
created “an undisciplined army.” 94 The leadership and responsibility
given to individuals who were personally responsible for crimes such
as rape, sexual assault, and pillaging compromises the military
institutions themselves and the society that the soldiers are meant
to protect.95
The systemic acts of sexual violence by armed individuals has per-
vaded society, even outside of the conflict, when former “military”
mix with civilians.96 The lack of reintegration policy for ex-militia and
military who are disarmed and sent back into the civilian community
aggravates the already-existing social inequities and violence against
women, as former soldiers often retain their violent tendencies.97
The institutionalized nature of sexual violence against women
extends to prisons where wardens exploit female detainees.98 Femi-
nist activists are targeted then raped, tortured, and murdered,
while young refugee girls are targeted by police and military then
sold or forced into prostitution.99 Sexual violence has truly moved
beyond conditions found just in the conflict. Sexual violence against
women has become “ ‘almost normal’ ”100 in regular society in the
90. Soldiers Who Rape, supra note 86.
91. Id.
92. Helping to Combat Impunity for Sexual Crimes in DRC: An Evaluation of the
Mobile Gender Justice Courts, OPEN SOC’Y INITIATIVE FOR S. AFR. 1, 12 (2012), http://www
.osisa.org/sites/default/files/open_learning-drc-web.pdf [http://perma.cc/U95M-GFBW]
[hereinafter Helping to Combat Impunity].
93. See infra Part III.A.2.
94. Breton-Le Goff, supra note 42, at 19.
95. See Helping to Combat Impunity, supra note 92, at 12.
96. Breton-Le Goff, supra note 42, at 19.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Jeffrey Gettleman, Rape Epidemic Raises Trauma of Congo War, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 7, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/07/world/africa/07congo.html?_&_r=2&
[http://perma.cc/9M4J-J72R].
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DRC, with huge increases in domestic abuse, husbands killing their
wives, and general “brutality toward women.”101
3. Impunity as a Contributing Factor
The basis for impunity and acceptance of sexual violence against
women in the DRC is rooted in the failure of government interven-
tion and the prevailing societal structure and mores.102 This is not
a problem isolated to the DRC or even to the African continent:
State-endorsed gender construction has served to advance state
interests from the time of the Roman Empire, through colonial-
ism and the Cold War, to contemporary politics. As with decisions
to protect or not, state interests are seminal in shaping popular
perceptions of masculinity and femininity. In turn, these construc-
tions are used by state officials to create opportunities for the
manipulation of protection.103
Women are essentially second-class citizens in the DRC: though
women often bear the burden of work and keeping a family together,
they have little to no power in the home or society.104 The hegemonic
masculinity105 inherent in the DRC society gives men power and
privilege while keeping it from women.106 Women are technically
minors for their entire lives, first under the authority of their fa-
thers and then under that of their husbands.107 Though the govern-
ment manages to enforce laws that maintain gender inequalities
and the superiority of men, “any new laws being enacted to protect
women appear to be unenforceable.”108
Early marriage and marital rape are not viewed negatively, and
sexual offenses are commonly seen as only possible “against young
virgin women.”109 This highlights the importance of a woman’s virgin-
ity, making her only as valuable as her sexuality, therefore classify-
ing her worth only in terms of the honor she brings to a man.110
Some tribes in the DRC require a widow to marry her deceased
101. Id.
102. Broussard, supra note 4, at 955.
103. Sparling, supra note 40, at 36–37.
104. See War Against Women, supra note 77.
105. Hegemonic masculinity is “a male-centered order.” LEATHERMAN, supra note 43,
at 17.
106. Id.
107. Breton-Le Goff, supra note 42, at 18.
108. Broussard, supra note 4, at 955.
109. Breton-Le Goff, supra note 42, at 18; see also LEATHERMAN, supra note 43, at 75.
110. See LEATHERMAN, supra note 43, at 77.
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husband’s brother, while others allow tribal chiefs to exercise first-
right privileges to have sexual intercourse with virgin women.111
The offense of sexual assault is not seen as against the victim, but
against her family “whose honor has been besmirched.”112 For this
reason, many victims hide their attacks or even run away from their
communities, afraid—often justifiably—that they will no longer be
accepted and supported as “damaged goods.”113
The structural inequality and lack of government involvement
in cases of sexual violence creates a society of impunity: in the
patriarchal society of the DRC, sexual violence is rarely reported,
laws do not fully protect women, and enforcement of laws to protect
women is severely lacking.114 A few scattered and damaged bill-
boards across the DRC telling men that rape is wrong visibly dem-
onstrate the government’s lack of concern for the pervasive problem
of sexual violence.115 The fact that a once noble—though nowhere
good enough—attempt to change societal perceptions of violence
against women is now literally whitewashed and dilapidated dem-
onstrates the deep-rooted injustice.116 What few reports are made to
the police pile up in the prosecutor’s office, where it takes a bribe to
even get an investigation started, yet few cases117 even make it to
court.118 The domestic Congolese law requiring sexual violence cases
to be heard within three months is almost never enforced, meaning
impunity is rampant, there is a general nationwide lack of trust in
the judicial system, and whatever justice is served has almost zero
deterrent effect on sexual violence.119
4. Efforts to Improve the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Despite the history of discriminatory laws and societal constructs
against women in the DRC, the past decade has seen significant
attempts to improve the situation for women and an internal desire
111. Breton-Le Goff, supra note 42, at 18.
112. Carol Mann, The Afghan State and the Issue of Sexual Violence Against Women,
in CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE: INTERNATIONAL LAW, LOCAL RESPONSES 123,
136 (Tonia St. Germain & Susan Dewey eds., 2012).
113. Ferril, supra note 43, at 353–54. In 2008, researchers in South Kivu “found that
over 20 percent of sexual violence survivors in [that] province” were rejected by their
families and communities. Ryan S. Lincoln, Recent Development: Rule of Law for Whom?:
Strengthening the Rule of Law as a Solution to Sexual Violence in the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo, 26 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 139, 147 (2011).
114. LEATHERMAN, supra note 43, at 75.
115. War Against Women, supra note 77.
116. Id.
117. A human rights investigator interviewed said she could count the number of cases
brought to trial on one hand. Id.
118. Id.
119. Lincoln, supra note 113, at 156.
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to prevent and prosecute conflict and peacetime sexual violence: “a
landmark sexual violence law” was enacted in the DRC in 2006,
which created an “improved legal framework” to prosecute sexual
violence.120 However, since then, there have been few, if any, actual
results.121 This law defines rape and statutory rape, criminalizes
these and many other sexual acts, and details punishments of five
to twenty years, which can be doubled for aggravating factors, such
as gang rape or threat or use of a weapon or other violence.122
Significantly, a procedural law was also enacted in 2006 giving
sexual violence victims certain protections, including medical and
psychological care and the ability to give testimony during trial in
camera to spare the impact of facing their attackers in person.123
This procedural law also allows for “expedited proceedings in rape
cases . . . .”124 Both of these laws apply in civilian and military
jurisdictions,125 though the widespread impunity for sexual offend-
ers often negates this significant legal effort.126
Another recent effort to prevent and punish sexual violence is
the establishment of gender justice mobile courts: these courts,
which work actively in local communities to fill the gaps left by the
government’s justice system, have had some success in the DRC.127
It is important, however, that the country itself is trying to make
changes to protect its own citizens. One significant recent case is
that of Colonel Engangela in August 2014.128 More than 900 victims
gave evidence of attacks on civilians—including mass rape, sexual
slavery, kidnapping, and murder—from 2005 to 2007 perpetrated by
Engangela and his men.129 This case is particularly significant due
to the accused’s high rank, his all-too-common story of a military
soldier-turned-rebel militia leader, and the DRC government’s recogni-
tion of “ultimate civil responsibility” for Engangela’s actions by
paying any damages with which he is sanctioned.130 Engangela was
120. Soldiers Who Rape, supra note 86, at 7.
121. Id.
122. Helping to Combat Impunity, supra note 92, at 11.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See supra Part I.C.3.
127. Helping to Combat Impunity, supra note 92, at 18; see also id. at 18–26 (giv-
ing detailed examinations of three mobile trials); id. at 27–36 (analyzing these courts’
effectiveness).
128. ‘Crucial’ to Protect Victims in Mass Rape Trial of DRC Officer, NEWS24 (Aug. 22,
2014), http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Crucial-to-protect-victims-in-mass-rape-trial
-of-DRC-officer-20140821-5 [http://perma.cc/7YA5-9U5B].
129. Id.
130. Id. Contra Only 2 Convicted of Rape in DRC Mass Trial, NEWS24 (May 5, 2014),
http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Only-2-convicted-of-rape-in-DRC-mass-trial-2014
0505 [http://perma.cc/2P2T-2TYQ].
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convicted of crimes against humanity and sentenced to life in prison.131
A month earlier, the High Military Court in Kinshasa sentenced
General Kakwavu to ten years in prison for rape and war crimes he
and his men committed from 2003 to 2005 while they were in the
Forces Armées du Peuple Congolais (FAPC).132 Though these are just
two trials among the many needed, they are a step in the right di-
rection against impunity in the DRC, with the lengthy sentence for
Engangela especially demonstrating that a once greatly feared man
can face life in prison for his crimes and those of his subordinates.
The key role of politics in this internal change was made clear
with the awareness and attention raised by President Kabila’s wife,
Olive Lemba Kabila, when she started a countrywide campaign to
combat sexual violence in November 2007.133 With one campaign led
by this highly placed politician’s wife, the problem of sexual violence
in the DRC gained a much higher profile, even garnering support
from UN agencies.134
Another acknowledgment of the problems the DRC is facing,
and the desire to remedy them, is demonstrated by the Congolese
government’s request to the ICC to prosecute armed group leaders
for international crimes in the DRC.135 The Congo’s General Prose-
cutor admitted that despite efforts, the judicial ability and success
with sexual violence prosecutions had not improved in the Eastern
Congo since 2008, citing “insecurity, lack of witness protection, and
lack of expertise in investigating . . . and gathering evidence . . . .”136
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW: SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING CONFLICT137
A. The Role of the International Criminal Court
A major reason for the creation of the ICC was to end the world-
wide cycle of impunity that resulted from national and international
criminal systems that did not consistently try perpetrators of serious
human rights violations.138 The Court was created on July 17, 1998,
131. U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, DRC: Conviction of ‘Colonel
106’ Major Boost in Fight Against Impunity (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/EN
/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15436 [http://perma.cc/E3BB-QM8S].
132. Id.
133. Soldiers Who Rape, supra note 86.
134. Id.
135. Helping to Combat Impunity, supra note 92, at 12.
136. Id.
137. See supra Part I.B. for a brief history of the changing international norms regard-
ing sexual violence during conflict.
138. K’Shaani O. Smith, Note, Prosecutor v. Lubanga: How the International Criminal
Court Failed the Women and Girls of the Congo, 54 HOW. L. J. 467, 476 (2011).
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when 120 states voted to adopt the Rome Statute and give the ICC
subject matter jurisdiction over “grave crimes including genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity.”139 The ICC only has
temporal jurisdiction for crimes committed after July 1, 2002, when
the Rome Statute came into force.140 The ICC’s territorial jurisdic-
tion is limited to crimes in the territory of a State Party, crimes for
which a non-State Party accepts the ICC’s jurisdiction, and crimes
committed by a State Party national.141 A State Party, the UN Security
Council, or the ICC Prosecutor can refer a specific case or a general
“situation” in a country to the ICC for initial investigation and pos-
sible prosecution.142
As a party to the Rome Statute,143 the DRC has agreed to be
bound by the accepted laws and jurisdiction of the ICC. The DRC’s
President Kabila referred the general situation of the conflict in the
DRC, including the specific case of Ntaganda, to the ICC in 2004.144
If Kabila had not referred it, another State Party, the Security Coun-
cil, or the ICC Prosecutor could have also initiated the case.145
In a nod to the importance of preventing sexual and gender-
based crimes, the Rome Statute specifically established measures
to effectively investigate and prosecute crimes within the ICC’s
jurisdiction “ ‘in particular where it involves sexual violence, gender
violence or violence against children.’ ”146 In order to pursue a case
that focuses on sexual violence charges, the Office of the Prosecutor
(OTP) must decide to focus efforts on those crimes during the “pre-
analysis phase” before beginning the investigation.147 This can cre-
ate difficulty with changing the direction of the case later in the
process. However, the OTP has worked to build a solid team with
expertise in the various aspects of sexually violent crimes to orga-
nize and prosecute these cases.148 In addition to the useful case
139. Meier, supra note 3, at 105.
140. Id.; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 11, UN Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
141. Meier, supra note 3, at 106; see also Rome Statute, supra note 140, art. 12, § 2.
142. Meier, supra note 3, at 105–06; see also Rome Statute, supra note 140, arts. 12–15.
143. The DRC signed the Rome Statute, the treaty establishing the ICC, on Septem-
ber 8, 2000, and ratified it on April 11, 2002. Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION (Feb. 13, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://treaties.un.org/Pages
/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&lang=en [http://perma
.cc/R4R8-HQCR].
144. ICC: Congolese Warlord to Go to Trial, supra note 1.
145. Meier, supra note 3, at 105.
146. Dianne Luping, Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes
Before the International Criminal Court, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 431, 433
(2009); see also Rome Statute, supra note 140, art. 54, § 1(b).
147. Luping, supra note 146, at 433–34.
148. Id. at 434.
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precedent from the ICC, the Rome Statute itself “codified rape, sex-
ual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced steril-
ization and any other form of sexual violence as grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions, and as war crimes and crimes against
humanity.”149 Additionally, the ICC has an independent fund from
which reparations are paid to sexual violence victims, as well as
other victims, if the convicted defendants are unable to pay.150 This
cannot repair the damage the perpetrators inflicted on these victims
but it is a clear demonstration that such crimes “will not be tolerated
by the international community or allowed to occur with impunity,
as they have in the past.”151
B. Significant Cases Involving Sexual Violence During Conflict
1. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) changed
the course of sexual violence prosecution after a far-too-long inter-
national “historical ambivalence” toward the use of sexual violence
during, and as a weapon of, war.152 The prosecution of Jean Paul
Akayesu, a mayor who encouraged widespread “sexual violence
against Tutsi women,”153 was the first case in which an interna-
tional criminal tribunal convicted an official for rape as a form of
genocide.154 He was also convicted of rape and sexual violence com-
mitted as a crime against humanity for the actions of his subordi-
nates.155 This was a significant precedential application of the Geneva
Convention in a case of sexual violence—specifically rape—as a seri-
ous human rights violation, rather than simply as an attack on a
woman’s honor.156
The ICTR, with the pressure of women’s groups, recognized the
importance of establishing sexual violence as one of the most serious
international crimes under its jurisdiction.157 It accomplished this
by going through the proper procedures of “indictment, prosecution,
149. Meier, supra note 3, at 113.
150. Ferril, supra note 43, at 362–63.
151. Meier, supra note 3, at 134.
152. Wood, supra note 29, at 276.
153. Id.
154. Id.; see also Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, § 8 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998) (convicted of crimes against humanity), http://unictr
.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-96-4/trial-judgements/en/980902.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3G27-494Y].
155. Ferril, supra note 43, at 357.
156. Wood, supra note 29, at 277, 282–83.
157. Id. at 290–91.
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and conviction,” applying the legal definitions of genocide and crimes
against humanity to sexual violence.158 The ICTR jurisprudence of
the Akayesu case also had a significant impact on other interna-
tional tribunals, regional courts, and state domestic court systems.159
Crucially, this case inspired multiple states to negotiate for im-
proved prosecution standards for sexual violence and an improved
definition of gender-based violence for the Rome Statute.160
The ICTR made history once again by prosecuting the first
woman, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, Rwanda’s Former Minister for
Women’s Affairs, for rape as a crime against humanity.161 The ac-
cused was a grandmother who awarded her soldiers’ efficient mur-
ders by allowing and encouraging them to abduct, systematically
rape, and murder women and girls.162 In June 2011, the judgment
was delivered, convicting her of genocide and rape as a crime against
humanity and as a war crime.163 Nyiramasuhuko’s conviction high-
lighted the fact that sexual violence is not always easily identifiable
or attributable to a certain group of perpetrators, but can in fact be
encouraged by the last person you would expect—even a sweet old
grandmother.164 This case reinforced the ICTR-established jurispru-
dence against wartime sexual violence, hopefully encouraging other
international and national jurisdictions to investigate, prosecute,
and deter sexual violence.165
2. International Criminal Court
Thomas Lubanga was the first DRC warlord indicted by the
ICC.166 However, despite the fact that evidence demonstrated that
he committed and allowed his subordinates to commit a grave
number of serious sexually violent crimes, the only charges brought
against him were war crimes related to child soldiers.167 Upon the
request of the victims’ attorneys post-prosecution, the ICC ruled
158. Id.
159. Id. at 293–94; see also id. at 292–98 (analyzing the significance of the Akayesu
decision).
160. Id. at 293.
161. Id. at 274.
162. Sam Sasan Shoamanesh, Nyiramasuhuko: The Mother Who Awarded Rape for
Murder, WORLD POST (Aug. 9, 2011, 1:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sam-sasan
-shoamanesh/nyiramasuhuko-the-mother-_b_922216.html [http://perma.cc/VX6F-9LMX].
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. Breton-Le Goff, supra note 42, at 24.
167. Id. Multiple pragmatic reasons existed for this streamlined prosecution approach,
including lack of resources and the need for a speedy trial. Id.
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that “additional charges could be brought” as based on the facts of
sexually violent crimes—such as sexual slavery—that already came
up during witness testimony.168 Eventually, the prosecutor addressed
the sexual crimes, but only within the child soldier conscription and
enlistment charges.169 This failed to extend the ICTR precedent of
accountability for all sexually violent crimes,170 and was therefore
insufficient despite the reasons for limitation. The prosecutor’s
failure to indict Lubanga for separate sexual violence charges un-
dermined the legitimacy of Lubanga’s more than 100,000 sexual vio-
lence victims, completely disregarding the issues of women and girls
in the DRC.171
Another significant ICC prosecution of a DRC warlord is that
of Germain Katanga, the former chief of the Lendu militia in the
Front de Résistance Patriotique d’Ituri (FRPI).172 This case was an
improvement upon Lubanga, but not good enough for the people of
the DRC.173 Charges of rape and sexual slavery were brought
against Katanga, and though they were complicated by difficulties
relating to the protected status of two witnesses, the prosecutor was
eventually able to bring those sexual crimes to trial.174 However, the
only charges of sexual violence were for crimes perpetrated in the
village of Bogoro, not for the many other crimes in the region of
Ituri, DRC, for which there was evidence of Katanga’s involvement
and leadership.175 Perhaps most upsetting for victims of sexual
violence in the DRC was Katanga’s acquittal for any responsibility
for a vicious mass rape that happened in Bogoro, despite his being
found indirectly responsible for a massacre there.176
Despite the progress made by the prosecutor indicting Katanga—
for the first time in ICC history—for sexually violent crimes, the
168. Smith, supra note 138, at 473.
169. See Breton-Le Goff, supra note 42, at 24–25.
170. See id.
171. Smith, supra note 138, at 474.
172. Breton-Le Goff, supra note 42, at 25.
173. See Mark Kersten, The Katanga Verdict and Its Legacy for International Criminal
Justice, JUST. IN CONFLICT (Mar. 12, 2014), http://justiceinconflict.org/2014/03/12/the
-katanga-verdict-and-its-legacy-for-international-criminal-justice [http://perma.cc/4GMH
-DQ78] (explaining that the Katanga case was only saved by the Trial Chamber stepping
in and performing the prosecutorial role).
174. Breton-Le Goff, supra note 42, at 25.
175. See id.
176. Kelly Askin, Katanga Judgment Underlines Need for Stronger ICC Focus on Sexual
Violence, OPEN SOC’Y JUST. INITIATIVE (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.opensocietyfounda
tions.org/voices/katanga-judgment-underlines-need-stronger-icc-focus-sexual-violence
[http://perma.cc/4F8Q-KQA9]. It must not be overlooked that the burden is on the prose-
cution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; though they were able to prove Katanga’s
responsibility for the massacre, they were clearly unable to do so for the sexual violence.
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failure to convict for sexually violent crimes not directly committed
or encouraged by Katanga was a setback to the fight against sexual
violence in armed conflict.177 The lack of convictions for sexual vio-
lence generally allowed by DRC leaders, though not always specifi-
cally directed or encouraged, reveals the double standard of rape
being a byproduct, rather than an instrument, of war.178 With these
two cases and the lack of justice for sexual violence victims, the
ICC’s decision does not serve to deter sexually violent crimes in the
future.179 However, the Court has the opportunity to do that with
the Ntaganda case.
3. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
In 2006, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) issued the first indictment for rape as a war
crime in the case of Prosecutor v. Gagovic.180 After three of the accused
were severed from this original indictment, the remaining Fo?a case
became the most famous ICTY case prosecuting sexual violence, nota-
ble for focusing solely on crimes of sexual violence,181 which enabled
the prosecution to fully highlight the depravity and violence. Three
Bosnian Serbs, Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac, and Zoran
Vukovic, ran “quasi-brothels” in the southeastern Bosnian town of
Fo?a, trading and selling women for sex and domestic chores.182 The
accused protested all of their charges, claiming (a) it was not rape
because some of the women liked the men and/or enjoyed the sexual
intercourse, (b) it was not enslavement because the women “were
not permanently ‘in [their] possession,’ ” and (c) it was not torture
because the women did not prove that they had suffered physically
or psychologically.183
All three men were convicted by the ICTY of the mass rape and
forced prostitution, among other charges, of dozens of women and
177. See id.
178. Id.
179. Id. Though common sense dictates that in almost any criminal trial in the world,
not every victim will feel that justice has been completely done.
180. Luping, supra note 146, at 446; see also Prosecutor v. Gagovic, Case No. IT-96-23,
Indictment, Counts 1–12 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 26, 1998), http://
www.icty.org/x/cases/zelenovic/ind/en/foc-ii960626e.pdf [http://perma.cc/58RB-CKUJ].
181. Luping, supra note 146, at 446; see Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-PT,
Indictment, Charges (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 8, 1999), http://
www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/ind/en/kun-iii991108e.pdf [http://perma.cc/FX4B-H58G].
182. Marlise Simons, Bosnian War Trial Focuses on Sex Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18,
2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/18/world/bosnian-war-trial-focuses-on-sex-crimes
.html [http://perma.cc/N6EH-GXRX].
183. Id.
676 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 22:655
girls.184 They were also convicted by the ICTY of rape and enslavement
as crimes against humanity.185 Unfortunately, this case heightened
the international standard for proving rape, now requiring the pros-
ecutor to show that the victim did not consent, therefore subjecting
victims to extreme and personal questioning, and possibly leading
to fewer victims coming forward in the future.186
C. Other Difficulties in Prosecuting Sexual Violence in an
International Court
A significant challenge in the international—and really any
domestic—justice system’s prosecution of sexual violence is giving
a voice and justice to the victims. Unfortunately, this difficulty is also
one of the major reasons for such prosecutions. In order to effectively
argue their cases, prosecutors need certain information from a per-
petrator-driven perspective, going through a narrative of the perpe-
trator’s actions and words rather than approaching the case based
on how the victims experienced the events.187 This prevents wit-
nesses from telling their stories in the way they naturally remember
them, which is often non-linear and contains understandable dis-
crepancies “due to post-traumatic stress syndrome.”188 Additionally,
defense counsel tactics can traumatize and revictimize the witnesses
by discrediting their testimony if they have sought psychological
counseling or are inconsistent.189 One defense counselor in the Fo?a
trial asked a woman who described not being chosen to be raped one
night “if she was jealous of” those who were.190 The questioning from
both sides’ counsel demonstrates that “ ‘courts of law mistrust the
natural voice of survivors’ ” and consequently can make victims mis-
trust the courts as well.191
Even before a trial begins, the intensely personal and sometimes
less visible nature of sexual crimes can create discomfort and, ulti-
mately, reluctance to investigate.192 This has, fortunately, been im-
proving, but there is still a long way to go. Additionally, even when
184. Id.
185. Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Judg-
ment of Trial Chamber II in the Kunarac, Kova? and Vukovi? Case, U.N. Press Release JL/
P.I.S/566-e (Feb. 22, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/010222_Kunarac
_Kovac_Vukovic_summary_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/2MR9-ZSSW].
186. Ferril, supra note 43, at 366–67.
187. See Wood, supra note 29, at 311.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 311–12.
191. Id. at 312.
192. See Askin, supra note 4, at 347.
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charges for sexual violence are brought, procedural and practical trial
delays can significantly impede “the delivery of justice to survivors
and the deterrent effect on perpetrators.”193
Specific attention should be drawn to several other interna-
tional prosecution difficulties that were touched upon previously. It
is impossible to prosecute every crime. That is common sense in
either a domestic or international context, and because of it, prose-
cutors have to make tough decisions. Not every crime can be prose-
cuted, so not every victim has the chance of getting her own justice.
Hopefully, for at least some victims, the punishment of their attack-
ers for other crimes gives them some relief. In addition to the prag-
matic reasons, usually limited money and time, for not prosecuting
every alleged crime, there are also institutional and political rea-
sons to limit the indictment—including focusing on other key prob-
lems in those areas, as the prosecutor focused on child soldier issues
with Lubanga’s case. However, such restrictions on time, money,
institutional pressures, and national or international politics should
not limit prosecutions for sexual violence. Prosecuting sexual violence
is imperative at this point in time because of the abysmal history of
failing to prosecute those crimes internationally and domestically.
This failure to prosecute, along with the overall culture of impunity
for sexual violence, has subsequently furthered the status of women
as second-class citizens in the DRC. The meager prosecutions to date,
and the cultural problems leading to and resulting from sexual vio-
lence, simply reinforce the need to develop international jurisprudence
on sexual offenses. Therefore, the international criminal community
should not only resist any possible reasons to avoid indicting and
prosecuting sexual crimes, but it should actively and enthusiasti-
cally investigate and prosecute them.
III. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ICC CASE AGAINST BOSCO NTAGANDA
A. Bosco Ntaganda in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
1. Rise to Power
Bosco Ntaganda was born in Rwanda in 1973.194 He fled to the
eastern DRC as a teenager when ethnic violence against fellow
Tutsis in Rwanda escalated.195 As a seventeen-year-old in 1990, he
193. Wood, supra note 29, at 313.
194. Penny Dale, Profile: Bosco Ntaganda the Congolese ‘Terminator,’ BBC NEWS AFR.
(Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17689131 [http://perma.cc/JCQ8
-G5ZS].
195. Id.
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joined the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) rebels composed mostly
of ethnic Tutsis in southern Uganda,196 and then fought in 1994 to
end the genocide in Rwanda.197 As the conflicts between groups in
Rwanda started to affect neighboring countries, including the DRC,
Ntaganda began to move back and forth between rebel groups and
national armies in both Rwanda and the DRC.198 The ease with
which he was able to switch armies truly demonstrates the extreme
volatility in this region and the plethora of opportunities for a
charismatic fighter to advance up the ranks of violent groups.
Though Ntaganda “is not an articulate or persuasive speaker” ac-
cording to Human Rights Watch researcher Anneke van Woudenberg
who met “The Terminator” several times, he does have presence due
to his 6 foot height and affinity for leather cowboy hats.199 His ruth-
lessness is clear as he denies any accusation of wrongdoing “and
comes up with excuse after excuse to justify what he has done.” 200
In an interview, Ntaganda referenced his responsibility during the
Rwandan genocide: to protect his fellow Tutsis, likely indicating
that he sees any of his actions as excusable because he has a duty
to “protect[ ] his own tribe . . . Tutsis in Eastern Congo, where they’re
a minority.” 201
The combination of the violent, chaotic atmosphere in the DRC
and Ntaganda’s particular set of leadership and fighting qualities
evidently created a great opportunity for his upward mobility through
the national and rebel armies. Similarly, other individuals with those
same characteristics could, and do, take advantage of the same cha-
otic situations in war-torn areas.
2. Ntaganda’s Actions as Militia Leader
Ntaganda served as the Deputy Chief of Staff and commander
of Military Operations of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC)
from 2002 to 2005.202 As a leader of the military wing, the Forces
196. Id.
197. See id. The RPF formed the government that is still presently in power in Rwanda.
Q&A: Hearing to Confirm the Charges Against Bosco Ntaganda at the International Crimi-
nal Court, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/06/qa-hear
ing-confirm-charges-against-bosco-ntaganda-international-criminal-court#1 [http://perma
.cc/8G2T-9E9R].
198. Dale, supra note 194.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Fiona Lloyd-Davies, The Terminator: General Bosco Ntaganda, STUDIO 9 FILMS
(May 21, 2012), http://www.studio9films.co.uk/blog/?p=171 [http://perma.cc/9WWU-MC2Q].
202. ICC: Congolese Warlord to Go to Trial, supra note 1. The Confirmation of Charges
for Ntaganda confirms that he was Deputy Chief. Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-
01/04-02/06, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the
Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda, ¶ 15 (Int’l Crim. Ct. June 9, 2014),
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Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC),203 Ntaganda likely
had superior responsibility for his subordinate forces’ “many serious
human rights abuses, including ethnic massacres, torture, rape, and
recruitment of child soldiers.” 204
Ntaganda left the UPC in 2006 and joined the rebel group Na-
tional Congress for the Defense of the People (Congrès National pour
la Défense du Peuple, CNDP) for several years.205 The CNDP consisted
of mostly ethnic Tutsis and was secretly backed by the Rwandan
government.206 On January 5, 2009, Ntaganda ousted the leader of the
CNDP and, despite an ICC-issued arrest warrant, integrated the
CNDP troops into the national army (FARDC) with the government’s
approval as part of a peace effort.207 Ntaganda was even promoted
to the rank of general in the FARDC in 2009.208 The government
claimed that his role was crucial for attaining peace in the country
and that his arrest “would undermine [that] . . . process.” 209
Ntaganda’s clear impunity, as he easily moved around the
country, understandably deeply offended his victims and those work-
ing through the proper processes for peace.210 A coalition of 51 non-
governmental organizations in the eastern DRC wrote to Congolese
President Kabila regarding the issue and encouraging him to turn
Ntaganda over to the ICC.211 The hypocrisy of the Congolese govern-
ment protecting Ntaganda after referring the DRC situation to the
ICC212 highlights the difficulties of prosecuting, and even capturing,
highly situated and powerful military leaders.213
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1783301.pdf [http://perma.cc/ASS3-5C9N] [herein-
after Confirmation of Charges].
203. Confirmation of Charges, supra note 202, ¶¶ 12, 15.
204. ICC: Congolese Warlord to Go to Trial, supra note 1.
205. Id.
206. David Smith, M23 May Be DRC’s New Militia, but It Offers Same Old Horrors,
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2012, 11:32 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov
/20/m23-drc-militia-horrors [http://perma.cc/8W76-792C].
207. “You Will Be Punished”: Attacks on Civilians in Eastern Congo, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Dec. 13, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/node/87142/section/1 [http://perma.cc/3933-F8U7].
Many of the former rebels who agreed to integrate into the FARDC remained loyal to
their former commanders, undermining real integration. See id.
208. DR Congo: Arrest Bosco Ntaganda for ICC Trial, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 13, 2012),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/13/dr-congo-arrest-bosco-ntaganda-icc-trial [http://perma
.cc/32XA-VWZS].
209. Id.
210. Letter from National Organisations to the President of the DR Congo on the Arrest
of Bosco Ntaganda, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/news/2009
/02/19/letter-national-organisations-president-dr-congo-arrest-bosco-ntaganda [http://
perma.cc/WM99-2538] [hereinafter Letter from National Organisations]; see also DR
Congo: Arrest Bosco Ntaganda for ICC Trial, supra note 208.
211. Letter from National Organisations, supra note 210.
212. See Breton-Le Goff, supra note 42, at 26.
213. There are commonly held doubts across Africa concerning the credibility of the
ICC. Id.
680 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 22:655
Despite those efforts, Ntaganda was not arrested or turned over
to the ICC; instead, he controlled 50,000 FARDC soldiers stationed
in Goma, in eastern DRC, and for years was allowed to enjoy “a life
of impunity and luxury” 214 while he and his soldiers wreaked havoc
through “rapes, looting and murders” in the north-eastern DRC, as
well as displacing 800,000 people from their homes.215
In April 2012, following calls for his arrest and attempts by the
Congolese government to limit his power,216 Ntaganda led his loyal
supporters, who had also been reintegrated into the army, to mu-
tiny.217 This put his new rebel army in direct opposition to the FARDC,
and even inspired another mutiny by a former colleague of Ntaganda’s
from the CNDP, Sultani Makenga, with whom he joined to create
M23.218 The group claimed to be protesting the DRC “government’s
failure to fully implement the March 23, 2009, [Pretoria] peace agree-
ment” with the CNDP, leading to the group’s name “M23.” 219 This
highlights the volatility of the situation in the DRC and the danger
faced by civilians caught in the middle between warring groups with
little stability and loyalty.
After Ntaganda created M23, the Rwandan government directly
aided the rebel group by deploying and recruiting troops and provid-
ing weapons, ammunition, and training.220 The United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, named five M23 lead-
ers, including Ntaganda, “among the worst perpetrators of human
rights violations in the DRC, or in the world.” 221 The brutality of
these leaders clearly led the soldiers to act with complete impunity,
as they still commit brutally sexually violent crimes, including raping
eight-year-old girls, murdering a twenty-five-year-old pregnant
woman for resisting rape, and pouring fuel between a woman’s legs
and lighting her on fire after gang-raping her.222
On March 18, 2013, Ntaganda voluntarily surrendered himself—
the first ICC accused to ever do so—to the United States embassy
in Kigali, Rwanda in order to be transferred to ICC custody in The
Hague, Netherlands.223 His surrender was likely due to infighting in
214. Dale, supra note 194.
215. Id.
216. DR Congo: M23 Rebels Committing War Crimes, supra note 60.
217. ICC: Congolese Warlord to Go to Trial, supra note 1.
218. See DR Congo: M23 Rebels Committing War Crimes, supra note 60. M23 and the
FARDC fought back and forth over the region around Goma, putting the community
there in the middle of incredible violence for the sole purpose of accumulating power and
control of mineral wealth in the area. See Smith, supra note 206.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. ICC: Congolese Warlord to Go to Trial, supra note 1.
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M23 and loss of Rwandan backing.224 Ntaganda’s diminished pres-
ence in the rebel groups and his constant cohort of bodyguards since
July 2012225 make it probable that he feared for his life and was
pushed out by soldiers loyal to his M23 rival, Sultani Makenga.226
3. ICC Charges Against Ntaganda
In 2004, Congolese President Joseph Kabila referred the situa-
tion in the DRC to the ICC Prosecutor.227 The ICC already had juris-
diction over crimes committed in the area because the DRC ratified
the Rome Statute on April 11, 2002.228 The Prosecutor initiated an
investigation on June 21, 2004, after a preliminary investigation
determined that action was warranted.229 The ICC’s first arrest war-
rant for Ntaganda as a rebel leader of the UPC was issued under seal
on August 22, 2006, “for the war crimes of recruiting and using child
soldiers during the war in Ituri in 2002 and 2003.”230 His second
arrest warrant, on July 13, 2012, covered the broader grave crimes
committed in Ituri,231 however, disappointingly, no charges are being
brought for the crimes committed in North Kivu by Ntaganda’s
troops due to restricted time and resources.232 The charges Ntaganda
faces were confirmed on June 9, 2014,233 and he faces individual
criminal responsibility through the various modes of liability of
indirect co-perpetration, direct perpetration, and ordering, inducing,
contributing, and acting as a military commander “for the crimes
committed . . . .” 234 The eighteen charges unanimously confirmed by
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II235 consist of thirteen counts of war
224. Id.
225. DR Congo: M23 Rebels Committing War Crimes, supra note 60.
226. Dale, supra note 194.
227. ICC: Congolese Warlord to Go to Trial, supra note 1.
228. Rome Statute, supra note 140 (The DRC signed the Rome Statute establishing
the ICC on September 8, 2000, and ratified the Statute on April 11, 2002.).
229. Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Case Information Sheet (Int’l
Crim. Ct. Sept. 7, 2015), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/NtagandaEng
.pdf [http://perma.cc/8L2K-89WR] [hereinafter Case Information Sheet].
230. ICC: Congolese Warlord to Go to Trial, supra note 1; see also Case Information
Sheet, supra note 229. The arrest warrant was unsealed on April 28, 2008. See Case In-
formation Sheet, supra note 229; see also Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-
02/06, Warrant of Arrest, 1–3 (Int’l Crim. Ct. Aug. 22, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/icc
docs/doc/doc305330.pdf [http://perma.cc/V6SD-KB2R].
231. ICC: Congolese Warlord to Go to Trial, supra note 1.
232. Id.; see also Case Information Sheet, supra note 229.
233. ICC: Congolese Warlord to Go to Trial, supra note 1.
234. See Confirmation of Charges, supra note 202, ¶ 97.
235. The ICC has multiple pretrial, trial, and appeals chambers that are numbered
for clarity and distinction between cases.
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crimes236 and “[five] counts of crimes against humanity . . . .” 237
These include four charges of war crimes (rape, sexual slavery of
civilians, rape of child soldiers, and sexual slavery of child soldiers)
and two charges of crimes against humanity (rape and sexual slav-
ery) that focus on sexual violence.238
B. Individual Significance: Practical Implications239
1. Expressive Value of a Sexual Violence–Focused Case
Charging Ntaganda with six charges of sexual violence is a
statement in and of itself. The ICC only has the funds to prosecute
several defendants each year, so it must select very carefully among
thousands of options with a specific goal in mind.240 Among select
audiences, the ICC’s actions merit respect, and therefore, the cases
it brings serve to increase the Court’s legitimacy.241 Though it may
have been ideal to have a Fo?a-like focus solely on sexual crimes,
Ntaganda’s case is a step in the right direction not only for the DRC
but also for the world. These charges demonstrate to the interna-
tional community that despite Ntaganda’s growing influence and
power over the last two decades, his rampant sexually violent crimes
are unacceptable under international law. The ICC is using its limited
resources to bring his crimes to trial and give justice to his victims.
2. Example Against Impunity for Sexual Violence
To this day, soldiers and civilians who commit sexually violent
crimes in the DRC have nearly complete immunity. Ntaganda is
well-known domestically and internationally for his crimes. As an in-
dividual who worked his way up from the bottom ranks of a foreign
resistance army through the upper echelons of not only Congolese
militias but also the national army, he is the best possible example
236. The thirteen war crimes charges are “murder and attempted murder; attacking
civilians; rape; sexual slavery of civilians; pillaging; displacement of civilians; attacking
protected objects; destroying the enemy’s property; and rape, sexual slavery, enlistment
and conscription of child soldiers under the age of fifteen years and using them to par-
ticipate actively in hostilities . . . .” Case Information Sheet, supra note 229.
237. The five crimes against humanity charges are “murder and attempted murder;
rape; sexual slavery; persecution; forcible transfer of population . . . .” Id.
238. Id.
239. This final portion of the Note alludes to facts and issues discussed throughout the
Note, and discusses arguments and solutions in light of those facts.
240. Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the Inter-
national Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 267 (2012).
241. Id. at 268.
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to those still committing horrific sexual violence in the DRC and
around the world. Ntaganda may not have faced prosecution during
his time in the DRC, but he is not escaping justice. There is an end
to his impunity. It is not realistic to expect the prosecution of every
individual who commits sexually violent crimes, but the trial of
Ntaganda—someone who once had so much power and control—
could serve to generally deter further crimes. Any individual who
commits and incites sexual violence during conflict will have to
consider the risk of an ICC investigation, prosecution, and sentence.
Furthermore, the ICC’s demonstration of justice for such a formerly
powerful individual may reenergize and inspire domestic govern-
ments and peoples to fight for an end to impunity and a stronger
judicial system that prosecutes sexual violence.
3. Giving Victims a Voice
Thousands upon thousands of women have been attacked because
of Bosco Ntaganda; whether by his own hand, or those of his men,
he is responsible for many victims.242 Each of the men who committed
such attacks is responsible. The other armed groups that committed
the attacks are responsible. Even if a victim has suffered multiple
attacks from various attackers, each and every attack matters. It does
not lessen the culpability of Ntaganda or any one of those attackers.
It does not change what those victims felt. Even if they never get a
chance to speak out against their other attackers, those victims
deserve to have a voice and speak out against at least Ntaganda.
They deserve a chance to finally be able to advocate for themselves
since they were unable to do so when they were attacked.
Fortunately, the ICC has already been very open to victim
participation in the Ntaganda case: in the pretrial proceedings for
the confirmation of charges, 1,120 victims participated,243 and Trial
Chamber IV issued a decision on February 6, 2015, detailing the
process for victim participation during the trial stage.244 One vast
improvement is the reduction of the victim application form from
seventeen pages to just one.245 This procedural change eliminates a
242. See DR Congo: Victims, Activists Respond to Warlord’s Surrender, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/26/dr-congo-victims-activists
-respond-warlord-s-surrender [http://perma.cc/TLH3-K8T6].
243. Mariana Pena, Victim Participation Decision in the Ntaganda Case: How Does
the System Compare to Previous Experiences?, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (Feb. 17, 2015),
http://www.ijmonitor.org/2015/02/victim-participation-decision-in-the-ntaganda-case
-how-does-the-system-compare-to-previous-experiences [http://perma.cc/7JGP-DUAB].
244. Id.
245. Id.
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significant barrier for victims to participate in the prosecution of
Ntaganda. Additionally, support from various sources—such as the
ICC Registrar and the NGO Avocats sans Frontières—helps to make
the process as smooth and easy as possible for the many victims who
want their voices heard.246 The huge turnout of victims simply for
the pre-trial stage demonstrates how eager victims are to have their
voices heard.
4. Logistically
The ICC is the best-situated court to prosecute Ntaganda. Of
course, if the Congelese government wanted to step up and charge
him domestically, that would be the ideal example of the domestic
fight against impunity. However, as has been addressed, domestic
prosecution is slow to improve in the DRC amid rampant impunity
and cultural views, though a clear effort is being made. Congolese
President Kabila himself referred the situation to the ICC in order
to attain international interference in a conflict that he could not,
or would not, handle domestically. Though Ntaganda was pushed
out of power in M23 and may therefore have fewer powerful friends
in the DRC, it is unlikely that the government would adequately
prosecute him when the same crimes are still being committed daily
by those in high positions of power.
Unfortunately, Ntaganda is the only remaining DRC leader
with an ICC arrest warrant.247 This is far from saying that there are
no other people who should be prosecuted. At this point in time,
however, there are no other outstanding warrants. Logistically,
there are no other options. There are no “re-dos” available to serve
as an example to the country and the world about the extreme vio-
lence and horrific acts committed daily against Congolese women.
Ntaganda is it. That places an extraordinary amount of pressure on
the Prosecutor to make this trial a demonstration of the power of
international law, but it also provides a fantastic opportunity to make
this case a changing point in the DRC’s, and the world’s, history,
and a deterrent example against sexual violence during conflict.
246. See id.; see also Victims’ Consultation on the Grouping for Their Legal Repre-
sentation in the Bosco Ntaganda Case, AVOCATS SANS FRONTIÈRES (Nov. 2013), http://
www.asf.be/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/ASF_IJ_Grouping-victims-in-the-Bosco
-Ntaganda-Case.pdf [http://perma.cc/2FEZ-UT5W].
247. International Criminal Court Prosecutions, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20
the%20prosecutor/prosecutions/Pages/prosecutions.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2016).
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C. Learning from Prior Cases in the Ntaganda Trial
The Ntaganda trial continues the pattern of sexual violence
prosecutions set by the ICTR Akayesu trial. It once again highlights
the seriousness of sexual violence and the necessity to follow proper
prosecutorial procedures to punish and deter such crimes.
The Prosecutor made a positive step by indicting Ntaganda for
all crimes enumerated in the Rome Statute’s jurisdiction that the
evidence supports,248 unlike the prosecutor in Lubanga.249 A focus
solely on sexual violence may have been a victory for sexual violence
victims, but the inclusion of all the crimes now enables, rather than
hinders, a sexual violence focus. Even at the time that the Lubanga
case was being tried, the chance for improvement with the Ntaganda
case was already clear: just as the Lubanga case gave a voice to the
victims of child soldier recruitment, Ntaganda’s prosecution will
give a voice to the victims of sexual violence in the DRC, as Lubanga’s
did not.250
Unfortunately, the indictment against Ntaganda only addresses
crimes committed in the Ituri region, neglecting those from the
North Kivu region. This continues the shortfall of the Katanga case
in which only one area of crimes was prosecuted. The ICC could
correct this problem in Ntaganda by amending the indictment. The
shortage of funds, however, and the failure to amend the original
indictment thus far, makes that unlikely. The justice felt by the
female victims from Ituri would hopefully be a victory felt by all of
Ntaganda’s victims because, though Ntaganda may not be charged
or convicted with all of his crimes, he will face justice and no other
women will have to face his brutality.
D. Potential Impact and Legacy of the Ntaganda Trial
1. ICC: Strong Sexual Violence Prosecution Precedent
The ICC does not yet have a landmark sexual violence case that
establishes strong prosecution precedent. The Fo?a case was a turning
point of sorts for the ICTY, demonstrating that the Tribunal recog-
nized and was willing to focus its efforts and resources to punish those
responsible for sexual violence. However, the jurisdiction of the ICTY
does not have the same deterrent effects on the DRC or other nations
248. See Confirmation of Charges, supra note 202.
249. Smith, supra note 138, at 476–77.
250. Eva Smets, Justice for “Bush Wives”: The ICC and Bosco Ntaganda, WORLD POST
(May 31, 2012, 10:26 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eva-smets/justice-for-bush
-wives-congo_b_1534000.html [http://perma.cc/K2KA-WW3C].
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like the ICC has. The ICC has wide jurisdiction over many countries
and needs to establish its own precedent against sexual violence.
The Ntaganda case will be that landmark case for the ICC. The
six charges alone are very powerful indictment precedent for the
Court. Lubanga was the first step for the DRC as a whole, holding
a leader responsible for his crimes and those of his subordinates.
Katanga went further by prosecuting sexual violence crimes. How-
ever, the emphasis on child soldiers in Katanga did not make it the
sexual violence precedent that the ICC—and the DRC as a coun-
try—needed. Ntaganda is the right opportunity for the ICC to dem-
onstrate that sexual violence is just as serious of a war crime and
crime against humanity, and thus warrants recognition, prosecution,
and prevention. The precedent established by this international
court will ideally impact many domestic governments and courts as
they pursue their own sexual violence prosecutions.
2. Domestic Impact on the Democratic Republic of the Congo
This trial will undoubtedly demonstrate to the people of the
DRC that sexual violence is not acceptable. First, it will show that
even the most powerful people in the country cannot escape prosecu-
tion for their crimes. The government of the DRC itself referred the
Ntaganda case to the ICC so that the international community
could effect justice. Clearly, there was already an internal perspec-
tive that impunity for sexual violence in the DRC should end. This
case will hopefully further the resistance against the cultural per-
ception of these crimes and against impunity as a whole. Second,
this example to the Congolese people and government could spur a
domestic change to prosecute these individuals on the home front.
The incredible involvement of victims in the pretrial phase shows
just how much the communities want these attacks and crimes to
stop. They are willing to work with an international court. This case
is a strong and inspiring example for the DRC fighters against
impunity to continue their efforts until there is a full cultural and
judicial shift in the perception of these crimes.
3. Impact on the International Community
The DRC is not the only country facing internal and cross-border
difficulties with various armies and militia. These conflicts rarely
leave the civilian population untouched. The prosecution of Ntaganda
will serve as an example to areas outside of the DRC that the ICC
prosecutes sexually violent crimes. In order to avoid the risk of the
ICC investigating a situation in a country, that country’s govern-
ment should take the initiative to prevent and punish sexual crimes.
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Perhaps the most important impact that the Ntaganda trial can
have on the international community is the development of custom-
ary international law. As addressed above, the world attitude toward
sexual violence has changed throughout time, moving toward a more
prohibitive perspective. Fo?a was crucial in its time for the United
Nations and the ICTY expressing their disapproval and willingness
to prosecute for sexual violence in the former Yugoslavia. However,
the ICTY’s limited jurisdiction and dwindling caseload limit the im-
pact that it has on the world overall. The ICC is an established and
permanent international court intended to prosecute international
crimes well into the future. Ntaganda will build upon the precedent of
Fo?a and other cases, and will be a clear and demonstrative sign of the
growing international abhorrence for sexual violence. The legal prece-
dent will continue to impact future cases, while the publicity of the
trial itself will also help make sexual violence not just an interna-
tional crime but also universally prohibited. With a universal distaste
for such crimes, the law will become customary and therefore bind-
ing on all people and states, not just those under ICC jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION—NOW IS THE TIME FOR CHANGE
For millennia, women have been victims of sexual violence
during times of conflict. For two decades, the women of the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo have endured violent attacks by militia
and government armies. Enough is enough. Bosco Ntaganda is the
last DRC leader with a warrant for his arrest. He is in ICC custody.
Eighteen charges have been confirmed against him, including six for
sexually violent crimes. His trial will be the example of the modern
age, showing definitively that the international community is against
sexual violence and that conflict is no excuse for such crimes. It is
unfortunate that an international court even needs to step in to deal
with a mostly domestic situation, but that further highlights the
unacceptability of the crimes committed in the DRC and the need
for change domestically and internationally. The international com-
munity will step in and intervene, because such crimes should not
occur in the future.
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